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TaBLE OF aCRONyMS
BDS  Biohazard Detection System
BT  Bioterrorism
CBRN  Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear
CDC  Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
CLIA  Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments 
COOP  Continuity of Operations Plan
CST  Civil Support Team
CT  Chemical Terrorism
DHS  Department of Homeland Security
DPHL  Delaware Public Health Laboratory
FBI  Federal Bureau of Investigation
FERN  The Food Emergency Response Network 
FY  Fiscal Year
HAN  Health Alert Network
HazMat  Hazardous Materials
HCV  Hepatitis C Virus
HHS  US Department of Health and Human Services
ICP/MS  Inductively Coupled Plasma/Mass Spectrometry
LRN  Laboratory Response Network
LRN-B  Laboratory Response Network for Biological Threats Preparedness and Response
LRN-C  Laboratory Response Network for Chemical Threat Preparedness
MSPHL  Missouri State Public Health Laboratory
NH PHL  New Hampshire Public Health Laboratories
PHEP  Public Health Emergency Preparedness Cooperative Agreement
PHL  Public Health Laboratory
WMD  Weapons of Mass Destruction  
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Laboratorians participate in a sentinel laboratory workshop at the San Antonio Metro Health District Laboratory. 




Federal support for public health laboratories through the Public Health Emergency Preparedness 
(PHEP) Cooperative Agreement has earned a significant return on investment since 2002. The $8 
billion invested under this Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) program has built a 
stronger preparedness infrastructure, enhanced national laboratory capability and public health 
surveillance systems, and forged partnerships between laboratories and their collaborators in 
emergency response.
The American people are the beneficiaries of this investment. In 2013 they are better protected 
from all hazards: biological, chemical, radiological threats and emerging infectious diseases such as 
pandemic influenza. Without this investment in modern equipment and technologies, professional 
staff and outreach, public health laboratories could not have responded quickly and efficiently to 
the 2001 Amerithrax threats, 2003 SARS outbreak, 2009 influenza A H1N1 pandemic and the 
2011 Fukushima disaster. Nor would they have had the capability and capacity to provide laboratory 
services for the Super Bowl or the Democratic and Republican National Conventions, or to detect the 
emergence of the dengue virus in Florida, not to mention routine testing to distinguish potentially 
lethal white powders from their benign look-alikes.
Specifically PHEP funding has underwritten a wide range of biological and chemical threat 
preparedness laboratory activities including:
• Biosafety Level 3 (BSL-3) facilities, now in all states, allow scientists to work safely with biological 
threat agents
• Expansion of Laboratory Response Network for Chemical Threat Preparedness (LRN-C) testing 
methods for clinical specimens
• Development of training courses on biosafety, packing and shipping of infectious substances, and 
the detection and transfer of threat agents
• Participation in nationwide competency programs and full-scale preparedness exercises
• Outreach to first responder communities
• Evaluation of new assays and platforms for rapid detection of threats. 
PHEP funding also has strengthened the entire public health laboratory infrastructure via: 
• Recruitment of highly skilled personnel
• Training of laboratorians to enable response to multiple threats
• Purchase of state-of-the-art equipment, maintenance contracts, critical reagents and supplies 
• Implementation of new systems for electronic communications and data messaging
• Enhancement of partnerships with private clinical, local public health, food, agricultural, 
environmental, military and academic laboratories
• Continuity of Operations Planning to support critical testing
• Improved engagement of state laboratory network partners, notably during the H1N1 pandemic 
when states effectively utilized their networks during the response.
Yet though we have made progress in forging an effective US laboratory system over the last decade, 
we dare not become complacent. After all, preparedness is not a destination; it’s a journey requiring 
constant vigilance, hard work and a sustained commitment to supporting the public health institutions 
that keep us safe. 
Sincerely,
Scott J. Becker. MS
Executive Director, APHL
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LaBORaTORy RESpONSE NETwORk (LRN)
In accordance with Presidential Decision Directive 39, the CDC, the FBI and 
APHL formed the LRN in 1999. This network is the nation’s premier system 
for identifying, testing and characterizing potential agents of biological and 
chemical terrorism. The LRN’s vast, integrated network of state and local 
public health, federal, military and international laboratories enables it 
to respond quickly to all-hazards threats.
State and local public health laboratories comprise approximately 
70% of the 160 LRN Biological Reference Laboratories and 
almost 100% of the LRN Chemical Laboratories. These 
laboratories produce high-confidence test results that are 
the basis for threat analysis and intervention by both 
public health and law enforcement authorities.
MISSION STaTEMENT
Biological Terrorism Preparedness Coordinator in full personal protective equipment (PPE) in the Biosafety Level 3 (BSL-3) 
Laboratory processing a suspicious powder sample. Photo courtesy of Lea Heberlein-Larson, Virology Supervisor, and Andrew 
C. Cannons, Laboratory Director, Florida Department of Health, Bureau of Public Health Laboratories - Tampa.
The LRN is a national security asset that, with its 
partners, will develop, maintain and strengthen 
an integrated domestic and international network 
of laboratories to respond quickly to biological, 
chemical and radiological threats and other high 
priority public health emergencies needs through 
training, rapid testing, timely notification and 
secure messaging of laboratory results.
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LRN-B aND LRN-C BaCkGROuND
Laboratory Response Network for Biological Threats Preparedness and 
Response1
The LRN for Biological Threats Preparedness and Response (LRN-B) is 
organized as a three-tiered pyramid (see Figure 1). At the foundation are 
sentinel clinical laboratories, which are tasked with initially screening for 
potential pathogens and either ruling-out biological terrorism agents or 
referring potential threat agents to a designated LRN Reference Level 
Laboratory, typically a state or large local public health laboratory. 
More than 160 state and local public health, military, international, 
veterinary, agriculture, food and water testing laboratories serve 
as reference laboratories by performing complex analyses and 
providing support to law enforcement for threat investigations.
At the apex of the pyramid are national laboratories, such 
as those at the CDC and the Department of Defense 
(DoD). These laboratories test and characterize samples 
that pose challenges beyond the capabilities of Reference Level 
laboratories (e.g., specialized strain characterizations, bioforensics) 
and provide support for other LRN members during serious outbreaks, 
public health emergencies or terrorist events. The most dangerous or perplexing pathogens 
are handled only at biosafety level 4 (BSL-4) laboratories at the CDC and the US Army 
Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID).
Laboratory Response Network for Chemical Threat Preparedness2
The LRN for Chemical Threat Preparedness (LRN-C) comprises laboratories that provide 
emergency response capabilities and chemical threat support to their local jurisdictions, 
the nation or both. Laboratories are designated Level 1, 2 or 3 based on 
the laboratory’s capabilities; these designations define the laboratory’s 
network participation (see Figure 2).
LEVEL 3 LABORATORIES
Eight laboratories designated as Level 3, work with hospitals and first 
responders to maintain competency in clinical specimen collection, 
storage and shipment.
LEVEL 2 LABORATORIES
Thirty-six laboratories designated as Level 2, are capable of detecting 
exposure to a number of toxic chemical agents (e.g., cyanide, nerve 
agents and toxic metals in human samples). These laboratories also 
have the capacity of Level 3.
LEVEL 1 LABORATORIES
Ten laboratories designated as Level 1, serve as surge-capacity 
laboratories for the CDC. In addition to Level 2 and 3 capacities, they also 
can detect exposure to more chemicals, including mustard agents, nerve 
agents and other toxic industrial chemicals. These laboratories are
intended to provide the CDC with much needed surge capacity during a large scale event.
8
Following the events of September 11, 2001, preparedness and response 
have been public health priorities to ensure the nation’s security. Public health 
laboratories serve as the nation’s first line of defense when assessing clinical, 
environmental, or food specimens and samples for all-hazards threats that could 
be of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) origin. Public health 
laboratories provide training to ensure proper preparedness, conduct timely 
and effective testing during events and report results to expedite the response 
to threats. Simply stated, these laboratories remain a crucial asset for national 
security. 
At the core of national security is the ability for the United States to prepare 
for, rapidly detect and respond to all-hazards threats. This preparation and 
response increases the need for collaboration among state and local public 
health agencies and federal partners. To foster this collaboration, public health 
laboratories maintain strong working partnerships with other laboratories (e.g., 
sentinel clinical, veterinary, military, environmental) as well as federal agencies 
such as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS),the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Additionally, public health laboratories 
engage first responders, such as law enforcement, fire departments, Hazardous 
Materials (Hazmat) teams and Civil Support Teams (CSTs).
States received an influx of funding for preparedness activities in response to 
the September 11 attacks. However, the steady decrease of overall 
preparedness funds and laboratory-specific funds over the 
past decade (as shown in Figure 3) significantly 
impacts public health laboratories’ 
activities.
INTRODuCTION
First responders participate in a training led by the Florida Department of 
Health Bureau of Public Health Laboratories in Jacksonville, FL. Photo courtesy of Phil Lee.
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As the laboratories work to maintain testing and efficient response with less 
funding, they increasingly rely on partnerships, networks, exercises and training.
APHL annually assesses all-hazards preparedness and response at public 
health laboratories in all 50 states, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico to 
document the successes and challenges experienced since the establishment of 
CDC’s PHEP Cooperative Agreement. 
This report summarizes the survey data from the CDC PHEP Fiscal Year (FY) 2011 
representing the 12-month period from August 10, 2011 to August 9, 2012. 
Additionally, this report provides a snapshot of laboratories in action highlighting 
their value in protecting the American people.
CDC PHEP FUNDING by FISCAL yEAR: Fy99-Fy11
Total funding to 62 grantees Total funding to public health laboratories




























In 1999, public health laboratories began receiving limited federal funding for 
preparedness activities. Following the terrorist attacks on September 11 and the 
subsequent anthrax letter attacks in October 2001, the United States Congress 
authorized supplemental funding via the PHEP Cooperative Agreement to support 
nationwide preparedness through state and local public health departments. This 
funding, which is administered by CDC, is the primary mechanism of support for state 
and local public health preparedness.
Since 2002, the PHEP Cooperative Agreement has provided approximately $8 billion 
to public health departments across the nation. In FY 11 (“Budget Period 11”), the 
CDC provided 62 awardees with approximately $613 million for preparedness and 
response to all-hazards threats, including infectious diseases, natural disasters and 
CBRN events. The PHEP awardees include the 50 states, Chicago, Los Angeles County, 
New York City, the District of Columbia, American Samoa, guam, the US Virgin Islands, 
the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, the Federated States of Micronesia, the 
Republic of the Marshall Islands and the Republic of Palau.3
After the 2001 incidents involving the biological agent, Bacillus anthracis (anthrax), the 
PHEP Cooperative Agreement initially focused resources on bioterrorism preparedness. 
This coincided with the original mission of the Laboratory Response Network (LRN), 
which brought together a small number of CDC-funded laboratories for biological 
and chemical terrorism preparedness. Later CDC expanded the scope of the PHEP 




APHL collected data in the fall of 2012 during its sixth annual All-Hazards Laboratory 
Preparedness Survey. Public health laboratories reported on their capability and 
capacity to respond to biological, chemical, radiological and other emerging infectious 
diseases such as influenza. The survey covered the 12-month period from August 10, 
2011 to August 9, 2012, representing the CDC PHEP Cooperative Agreement FY 11.4
The survey generated a 100% response rate, representing public health laboratories 
in all the 50 states, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico. Complete aggregate 
survey assessment results are available online at http://www.aphl.org/aphlprograms/
preparedness-and-response/biological-threats/pages/default.aspx. For the purposes 
of this report, the term “state public health laboratories” will be used to describe all 52 
respondents.
Data were collected using Qualtrics,5 a Web-based survey tool and data repository. 
Descriptive statistics were gathered for all categories: workforce, planning and 
response, biological threat preparedness, chemical threat preparedness and 
radiological threat preparedness. The following sections present stories and 




Water Testing, LRN-b and -C Exercises,
and a Sprinkling of  Paprika in Missouri
Following a severe drought season in 2011, Missouri citizens became 
concerned about the safety of their private wells, and the Missouri 
State Public Health Laboratory (MSPHL) received an influx of samples, 
double the number from previous years. How was the MSPHL to handle 
this influx?  Fortunately the lab had purchased through PHEP funds an 
Inductively Coupled Plasma/Mass Spectrometry (ICP/MS) instrument 
that could test drinking water. This same instrument also quantified the 
amount of lead present in a brand of paprika suspected of poisoning 
a child with an elevated blood lead level. Results showed that the 
paprika was contaminated, and the product was removed from the 
market.
Additionally, PHEP funding supported the MSPHL’s participation 
in preparedness exercises. In September 2011, the laboratory 
participated in a multistate LRN/CDC Bio-Response Operational Testing 
and Evaluation exercise designed to assess laboratories’ capability to 
test surface sample swabs, wipes and socks for a Bacillus anthracis 
surrogate. The following month, the MSPHL participated in a weeklong 
full-scale EPA Region 7 and 8 exercise testing laboratory response 
plan procedures for sample collection, shipment, analysis and data 
reporting based on scenarios of chemical and biological origin. In 
2012 the MSPHL participated in a Biohazard Detection System (BDS) 
exercise that tested laboratory response time after postal inspectors 
delivered a BDS cartridge for threat analysis. 
These exercises tested the MSPHL’s ability to effectively utilize its 
LRN-B and LRN-C methods, and evaluated the level of cooperation 
between the laboratory and federal partners. Results showed that 
the exercises strengthened relationships with federal agencies, and 
reinforced the importance of the laboratory as integral to national 
preparedness. 
Fran Thompson, senior chemist, analyzing drinking water samples on the Inductively Coupled Plasma-Mass Spectrometer. 


































For FY11, the 52 state public health laboratories reported 
receiving a total of $80 million in funding from the CDC 
PHEP Cooperative Agreement, non-CDC federal, state and 
other sources for biological, chemical and radiological threat 
preparedness. This funding underwrites salaries, renovations, 
training, and equipment purchases and maintenance (see 
Figure 4).
FINDINGS:
puBLIC HEaLTH LaBORaTORy FuNDING





























































Top 5 Impacts of  Funding Cuts for biological and Chemical
Threat Preparedness During Fy11
BIOLOgICAL CHEMICAL
Unable to expand capabilities for new assays 
and tests
Unable to purchase critical equipment 
Unable to renew service/maintenance 
contracts for instrumentation
Unable to expand capabilities for new assays 
and tests
Loss of full-time staff positions Unable to renew service/maintenance 
contracts for instrumentation
Unable to provide or reduced the number of 
training courses and other outreach activities
Unable to attend training courses






























During FY11, the majority of state public health 
laboratories utilized rapid communication methods to 
contact sentinel clinical laboratories and other partners 
for outbreaks (85%), for training events (73%) and for 
routine updates (71%). For example, the New Hampshire 
Public Health Laboratories (NH PHL) utilized the Health 
Alert Network (HAN) during a hepatitis C outbreak during 
the summer of 2012.
PLaNNiNg: Forty-seven laboratories (90%) reported that they have 
either a state agency or department-wide Continuity of Operations 
Plan (COOP) or a laboratory-specific COOP. This number is up from 42 
laboratories in FY10. 
ResPoNse: Fifty laboratories received a total of 4,322 specimens 
and samples for LRN threat testing from the following partners: FBI, 
local or branch PHLs, local/state law enforcement, CSTs, the US Postal 
Service, Hazmat teams or sentinel clinical laboratories. These samples 
ranged from clinical specimens for referral or rule-out testing to high-
risk environmental samples (e.g., suspicious letters to political officials) 
received for testing of suspect threat agents.
FINDINGS:
pLaNNING aND RESpONSE
The Incident Commander briefs supervisors during New Hampshire’s HCV outbreak.  
Photo courtesy of Maureen Collopy from the NH Department of Health and Human Services. 
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pHEp SuCCESS:
LRN Connects New Hampshire Labs to Fight Hepatitis C Outbreak
The medical community considers hepatitis C virus (HCV) to be among the most serious of 
the hepatitis viruses. Most people who contract it don’t even know they have the disease until 
decades later when liver damage becomes apparent. Early detection of the disease can lead 
to treatment or lifestyle changes that may slow liver damage. In May 2012, after a cluster of 
cases presented with matching HCV sequences, the Division of Public Health Services (DPHS) 
in New Hampshire moved quickly to investigate. 
DPHS determined that the cluster of cases had been treated in the Cardiac Catheterization 
Lab at the Exeter Hospital.6  To track down any additional cases, testing clinics were set 
up in various locations in the southern region of the state. The clinics obtained blood 
samples, performed rapid testing on-site, and packaged and transported samples to the 
New Hampshire public health laboratory (NH PHL). The CLIA-waived OraQuick® HCV Rapid 
Antibody Test provided on-site results to physicians who counseled patients at the testing 
facility. 
The clinics’ mission was to test all patients who requested the service. To handle the volume 
of testing required, the NH PHL reached out to all of its employees and to LRN sentinel clinical 
partners. Volunteers came from all sections of the lab: Water analysis, chemistry, molecular 
diagnostics, information technology, virology, microbiology and administration, including 
clerical staff and interns, all contributed to the outbreak response from pre-analytical through 
post-analytical processes. In addition, partners from five hospitals and an LRN Reference 
Level Laboratory volunteered to assist at the clinics. The response was overwhelming: NH 
PHL received an ample number of volunteers to conduct phlebotomy and on-site testing; 
laboratorians even assisted during their off hours and vacations.
The NH PHL communicated with sentinel clinical labs through the Health Alert Network (HAN) 
and the NH LRN listserv, with the HAN providing situational updates to healthcare providers 
and sentinel clinical labs, and the listserv serving as a mechanism to request assistance from 
LRN partners. 
Though the LRN is most commonly known for response to acts of biological or chemical 
terrorism, its mission applies to all high priority public health emergencies requiring 
rapid testing, timely notification and secure messaging of results. In this instance, LRN 
infrastructure enabled the NH PHL to quickly and efficiently respond to the HCV outbreak, 
which was eventually linked to an infected medical technician.
HCV OraQuick results. Clinics in New Hampshire performed this rapid method to test for hepatitis C.  
Photo courtesy of Maureen Collopy from the NH Department of Health and Human Services. 
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seNTiNeL CLiNiCaL LaboRaToRies: All 52 state public health 
laboratories indicated that they maintain a database of sentinel 
clinical laboratories, with a total of 4,147 active laboratories. In FY10, 
48 laboratories reported a total of 4,415 active sentinel clinical 
laboratories.
In FY11, 44 state public health laboratories (85%) 
reported sponsoring sentinel clinical laboratory trainings 
in their respective states; this represents an increase 
from FY10 when 41 laboratories reported sponsoring 
these trainings, which improve detection and response 




Francisella tularensis growth on Chocolate Agar at 48 hours. This method is commonly utilized to differentiate threat agents. 
Photo courtesy of Maureen Sullivan, Minnesota Department of Health.
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pHEp SuCCESS:
Clinical and Public Health Labs in Delaware
Collaborate to Confirm Francisella tularensis
On September 28, 2011, a local hospital in Delaware admitted a 
46-year-old man who presented with fever, chills and chest pain.  Blood 
cultures revealed no bacterial growth after five days, but a pleural fluid 
specimen was collected for further laboratory testing. The cultures 
and gram stain concerned the bench laboratorian and microbiology 
supervisor so much that they moved the specimens and cultures 
to a biosafety cabinet to perform sentinel laboratory testing for the 
rule-out or referral of a potential biological threat. When the hospital 
laboratory was unable to rule-out the organism as a potential threat, 
the supervisor contacted the Delaware Public Health Laboratory 
(DPHL) to request testing for F. tularensis, a CDC select agent that 
causes the disease tularemia in humans and animals. Humans can 
become infected via tick or deer fly bites, skin contact with infected 
animals (e.g., rabbits, hares, rodents), ingestion of contaminated water 
or inhalation of contaminated dusts or aerosols. Humans can also 
become infected as a result of a bioterrorism attack.7
 
On October 5, 2011, the hospital laboratory shipped the 
pleural fluid specimen to the DPHL where the bioterrorism 
staff quickly initiated preliminary testing by real-time 
polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR). Preliminary results 
indicated the presence of F. tularensis and laboratorians 
contacted the hospital the night of October 5, 2011. Final 
cultures confirmed the presence of the organism on October 
6. Following this confirmation, the DPHL promptly began 
communications with the CDC and shipped the specimens 
to the CDC for further analysis and characterization. The 
patient was placed on intravenous antibiotics and made 
a full recovery. He revealed that he had previously mowed 
over a rabbit carcass with his lawnmower, thus putting him 
at risk for infection by a contaminated aerosol. 
The successful detection and identification of F. tularensis 
within eight days of a patient presenting with symptoms 
was possible due to the ongoing partnership and 
collaborations between the DPHL and sentinel clinical 
laboratories. The hospital microbiology supervisor and 
several bench technologists had attended DPHL’s “Agents 
of Bioterrorism: Sentinel Laboratory Training” workshops 
that discuss laboratory safety, the LRN, select agents and 
organisms that resemble select agents. It was this training 
that enabled them to identify F. tularensis. 
A microbiologist from the Delaware Public Health 
Laboratory performs testing on Francisella 
tularensis. Photo courtesy of Debra Rutledge.
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For FY11, 50 state public health laboratories either 
maintained (62%) or increased (35%) their LRN-C 
capabilities. This level of preparedness ensures effective 
and timely laboratory response to any chemical event.
FINDINGS:
CHEMICaL THREaT pREpaREDNESS
A laboratorian processes samples in a chemical fume hood.  
Photo courtesy of the Virginia Division of Consolidated Laboratory Services (DCLS). 
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pHEp SuCCESS:
LRN-C Lab Analysis Reopens School After Mercury Spill 
in North Carolina
Mercury exposure is highly dangerous. It can result in fever, fatigue and 
clinical signs of pneumonitis. Chronic exposure can lead to neurological, 
dermatological or renal effects. As happens periodically, in 2012 a student 
brought a vial of mercury to a North Carolina school. When the 15 milliliter 
vial broke spilling 203 grams of mercury, the teacher attempted to clean 
it up with a broom (one of the worst things to do,8 as it can disperse the 
mercury). School officials evacuated students, and the EPA On-Scene 
Coordinators advised them to shut down the ventilation system and open 
windows. Students in the spill zone were asked to remove their shoes and 
bag them. Four students and one teacher suspected of exposure were 
transported to the local hospital.
The laboratory director at the North Carolina State Laboratory of Public 
Health informed the primary contact for the incident that the Chemical 
Terrorism (CT) Unit at the State Lab could perform blood mercury testing on 
the exposed individuals. Samples were taken and the hospital contacted 
the CT unit to ensure proper containers and shipping protocols were being 
used. 
The CT Unit guided the hospital as to what type of blood tubes to use, how 
to label them for the CT lab and how to properly package the samples 
for shipment. Though none of the hospital staff had attended training on 
CT packaging and shipping, they were familiar with how to ship general 
specimens to the lab.  The samples were successfully received by the CT 
lab, which found no elevated mercury levels in the blood. With fears calmed, 




Radiological threat preparedness remains a major gap for 
state public health laboratories. For FY11, only 27 laboratories 
(52%) indicated that they are responsible for performing 
radiological testing: All 27 test environmental samples, while 
only 19 test food samples and six test clinical samples. 
While the majority of these laboratories are not certified or 
accredited, five are accredited by the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission. 
These gaps are a direct result of the lack of radiological threat 
preparedness funding:
• Three laboratories reported receiving a total of $785,000 
from non-CDC federal sources.
• Four laboratories reported receiving a total of $320,000 
from their states.
• Three laboratories reported receiving a total of $50,000 
from other sources.
Significant investments are needed to ensure laboratories 
have the capacity and capabilities to respond to radiological 
threats, such as the 2011 Fukushima disaster.
Responders with full personal protective equipment (PPE) prepare for a radiological event.
21Paul Marbourg, a chemist from the Washington State Public Health Laboratories, stands next to the gC-MS instrument on 
which a cyanide method was run for the national convention samples. Photo courtesy of Blaine Rhodes. 
pHEp Success:
No Cyanide for Dinner Courtesy of  LRN-C Lab in Washington
Of the 35% of laboratories that increased their LRN-C capabilities in 
2012, two-thirds added at least one new method to their skillset. The 
Washington State Level 2 Chemical Incident Response Laboratory was 
one of these. It chose to add cyanide testing.
Cyanide is a rapidly acting, potentially deadly chemical that can exist 
in multiple forms. For the 2012 national political conventions, the 
Food Emergency Response Network (FERN) was concerned about 
cyanide poisoning of food served at the conventions, a threat that 
could potentially affect thousands of people.  It reached out to the 
Washington Public Health Laboratories for help.
With its highly trained LRN-C chemists and state-of-the-art equipment, 
the Washington State Laboratories adapted the LRN method to rapidly 
and accurately screen for cyanide at the limits desired by the FERN. 
The adapted method — now under consideration for nationwide 
implementation as a FERN method — was used to test 20 composite 
samples for the 2012 Republican Convention and 20 samples for the 
2012 Democratic National Convention. Washington State Laboratories 




Public health laboratories are first responders working on the front 
lines of public health to protect communities from all hazards. They 
provide timely data on biological and chemical threats; perform 
routine surveillance and diagnostics; and train clinical laboratories 
to recognize, rule-out and refer potential threat agents. Their role in 
protecting public health and safety continues to expand even as federal 
and state funding shrinks.
Without sustained support for this critical health resource, the 
nation’s security will be compromised.
Laboratorians await samples during a night exercise with the Minnesota Public Health Laboratory.  
Photo courtesy of Courtney Demontigny.
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